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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a decision by the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court Judge Presiding, to the
Utah Court of Appeals. The appeal is authorized pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1992.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Sexual infidelity by one of the parties during a marriage

and before a divorce is granted, and such may constitute grounds
for divorce, and may be relevant in a child custody dispute,
however,

notwithstanding

the

foregoing,

in

the

absence

of

"cohabitation" occurring after divorce, the issue is not relevant
to a permanent alimony award. See Haddow v. Haddow/ 707 P2d 669,
671-672 (Utah 1985).
2.

A party who leads a court into error cannot later

complain of that error to obtain reversal, see Merriam v. Merriam,
799 P2d 1172, 1175 (Ut App 1990). Prior to entry of Finding of
Facts, Conclusions of Law and the Divorce Decree, the court, in the
instant case, did meet and seek counsels' advice, objection and
approval of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Divorce Decree. Only after receiving said advice and approval from
both counsel, did the Court sign and enter the same. Defendant's
counsel's

approval

is

evidenced

by

his

signing-off

on

said

pleading, by affixing his initials thereto. See the Court Minute
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Entry (T-61) Likewise, without said approval, the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree in the instant case would not
have been accepted, signed and entered by the Court. The Defendant
did in effect co-author the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
entered by the Court, and the Defendant did thereby waive his right
to challenge the adequacy of such findings of fact by the within
appeal.
3.

The appropriate criteria for an awcird of alimony is as

follows: the financial condition of the spouse claiming a need for
alimony, the ability the claiming party to provide such support and
maintenance for him or herself, and the ability of the responding
spouse to provide such support. See Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P2d
952, 958 (Ut Ct Appeals 1988) In the instant case the evidence was
that the Plaintiff, at all times pertinent hereto, was on Public
Assistance, she was and is without marketable job skills as a
result of parties having married right out of high school and
having children shortly thereafter, the raising of three small
infant children while maintaining a household for the Defendant has
substantially diminished Plaintiff's employment alternatives now
and in the future, and in comparison, at the time of entry of the
Decree herein, the Defendant had completed nearly Five (5) years of
post high school or college courses, and the Defendant had a proven
and established earning capacity far in excess of his regular and
customary employment, evidenced both by his investment portfolio
and the relatively large sums of money in his control at the time
2

of the parties' separation.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None
Counsel for the Appellee urges that Section 30-3-5(6) Utah
Code Annotated, as Amended is dispositive of any an all of the
issues Appellee has raised on appeal. Said code section is not
applicable because it applies to post decree alimony payments to a
former spouse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a
Third District Court determination that the Appellant pay permanent
alimony to his former wife of a relationship and marriage that
lasted nearly Eight (8) years. The parties commenced having a
sexual affair three years before marriage, when the Plaintiff was
a junior in high school (T-114). The parties married after the
Plaintiff was Three (3) months pregnant. The divorce proceeding was
commenced after the foregoing plus Five (5) years

of formal

marriage and three children later.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Plaintiff commenced the divorce proceeding in the Third
Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
to dissolve the marriage between herself (Plaintiff/Appellee) and
her husband (Defendant/Appellant). The matter came on regularly for
Two and One Half (2 1/2) days of trial on the 4th, 5th and 6th days
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of December, 1991, before the Honorable John Rokich, District Court
Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT
Following the trial of this matter the Third District Court
awarded,

among

other

things,

permanent

alimony

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellee, and from said Court's order awarding permanent
alimony to the Plaintiff the Defendant/Appellant now appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion by
awarding the Plaintiff permanent alimony. The evidence presented at
trial showed that the Plaintiff was in need of support and
maintenance, the Plaintiff lacked, now and in the future, the
ability to adequately provide such support and maintenance for
herself and that the Defendant had the ability to provide said
support

for

the

Plaintiff,

and

the

children.

The

Defendant/Appellant co-authored the Findings of Fact and can not
now claim error to obtain reversal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant/Appellant, husband was born the 29th day of
November, 1966. The Plaintiff/Appellee, wife was born the 25th day
of February, 1967. The parties began having sexual relations Three
(3) years before their marriage while both were in high school. The
parties were married on the 30th day of November, 1985. Since the
4

marriage

and

until

the

separation

of

the

parties

and

the

commencement of the within proceedings the Defendant/Appellant has
been the primary income provider for the parties, and the Plaintiff
has worked primarily in the home raising the parties' infant twins
and elementary age children and maintaining the household. Three
(3) children have been born as issue of this marriage. The oldest
child was born on the 18th day of May, 1986. The twins were born on
the 18th day of July, 1990. The Defendant had left and estranged
himself from the Plaintiff at the time the twins were born on the
18th day of July, 1990, and he was living with another woman. (T324). The parties formally separated in August, of 1990, and
between the date of separation in August, 1990, and the trial of
this matter in December, 1991, the Defendant failed, neglected and
or refused to pay meaningful support to the Plaintiff, for her
maintenance, and for the support and maintenance of the parties'
minor children. The record shows that the Defendant only paid to
the Plaintiff the sum of Three Hundred Eighty Five ($385.00)
Dollars on two occasions, other insignificant sums from time to
time during the period from the parties' separation to the date of
trial (T-165-172).
In 1989 the Defendant earned Sixteen Thousand Four Hundred
Fifty One ($16,451.00) Dollars in wages, Three Thousand Two Hundred
Seven ($3,207.00) Dollars in dividends or investments for a total
income for 1989, of Nineteen Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Eight
($19,658.00) Dollars (T-179).
5

The Defendant's 1990 Income Tax Return, Court Exhibit 4-P,
reflected numerous investments made by the Defendant while married
to the Plaintiff (T-180).
Furthermore, in 1990 while married to the Plaintiff, Defendant
had on deposit at Valley Bank and Trust, on the 13th day of August
1990, the sum of $14,472.00, (T-181), and just one month later,
after the twins were born, and after the divorce proceeding was
commenced, the said bank balance was $355.00. During the said
period $14,000.00 was withdrawn from said account, and not one cent
of that money was used for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff or
the parties' minor children. (T-181, 187). The Defendant explains
his failure to provide for the Plaintiff and his minor children by
stating, "we were separated at the time". The net effect of the
Defendant's failure to support his wife, the Plaintiff, and their
three minor children were compelled to apply for, and receive
public assistance. (T-79)
In addition to the foregoing, and approximately at the same
time, the Defendant owned, possessed or controlled a Paine Webber
Security Account having a balance or value of Nine Thousand
($9,000.00) Dollars, (See court Exhibit 6-P). The Defendant sold
the account at a discount and gave Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty
($7,650.00) Dollars, of the proceeds from said account to his
father. (T-184, 185). Purportedly to pay a questionable demand note
that was suddenly called due.
The Defendant testified that after the twins were born he had
6

and maintained sole use and possession of the following revenues:
Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars investment income; Fourteen
Thousand ($14,000.00) Dollars, from the checking account; Seven
Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars from the Paine Webber
Account; and in addition to the foregoing, the Defendant had his
bi-weekly earnings of Six Hundred Fifty Two ($652.00) Dollars. The
Defendant further testified that he had expenses of Six Hundred
($600.00) Dollars per month. The Defendant, during the described
period, was residing with two women, sharing a bedroom with one,
and not paying any meaningful support for the Plaintiff or for his
three minor children.(T-186-189) (T-192-193).
The Plaintiff did testify to having sexual relations with a
male friend, who was not residing or living with her. The Plaintiff
did have and use in her residence a used T.V. and Two (2) chairs
belonging

to

the

male

friend.

The

arrangement

was

one

of

convenience, the friend had moved to a new residence and did not
have room at his new home for the said items. (T-149-152) The
Plaintiff testified that the said male friend did not live with her
and her children at her home. (T-151).
The trial Court heard testimony from the parties and other
witnesses, reviewed the documentary evidence presented at trial,
and at the conclusion of the court proceedings declared that the
Court did not believe the testimony and the evidence of the
Defendant/Appellant. The Court ordered that counsel for the parties
prepare proposed findings of fact. That once the findings were
7

prepared the Court would conference with counsel to finalize the
findings. At said conference the parties' counsel with the Court
approved the Findings of Fact the subject herein. The approval by
the Defendant is evidenced by counsel's initials thereon. The
Defendant, who through that conference, and his approval can not
now claim error to obtain reversal. See Merriam v. Merriam# 707
P2d, 669, 671-672 (Utah, 1985).
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ONE
In the instant case, there can be no question that the
Plaintiff was not "cohabiting" with a member of the opposite sex
under the guidelines set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P2d 669 (Ut
1985), and she certainly was not in violation of Section 30-3-5(6)
Utah Code Annotated, as Amended, as being a "former wife" receiving
alimony from the Defendant while residing with a person of the
opposite sex. He was not living with her. He was not paying
Plaintiff's utilities. The Plaintiff was under the watchful eye of
Social Services as well as the Defendant herein, and the record
fails to show that Plaintiff was cohabiting with her male friend.
There was testimony by an independent witness, Erick Roosa, called
by the Defendant to prove cohabitation by the Plaintiff. Mr. Roosa,
testified that he couldn't say that Plaintiff's friend, Rick
Onesta, was living in the home with the Plaintiff. Mr. Roosa
testified as follows, that: "I can't come up with facts, No, I
can't say that he's actually living there, or anything". (T-234-
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235)
REPLY TO ARGUMENT TWO
Paragraph No. 5 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that
Defendant did not adequately financially support the Plaintiff and
their minor children.(T-63)
Paragraph No. 8 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that the
Defendant was gainfully employed, having the following earnings:
... earned as an employee of Universal painting during 1990,
the gross yearly sum of $15,296.00, and presently earns the
gross amount of $1,387.00 monthly.(T-64)
In addition to the forgoing, the record is replete with
Defendant's historical earnings from investments and other sources
owned and controlled by the Defendant during the marriage and
concurrently liquidated and paid over to Defendant's father. Said
payment was purportedly to pay preexisting debt unknown to the
Plaintiff,

and

asserted,

suspiciously,

just

as

the

parties

separated. (T-182-187)
Paragraph No. 13 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that the
Plaintiff was without means or ability to pay for court costs and
attorneys' fees rendered in this case. (T-64)
The record at trial

established

that the Plaintiff was

receiving public assistance following the separation from the
Defendant. She was the mother and custodial parent of three small
children. She has graduated from high school having limited working
experience, and she has no definable marketable working skills. (T110-115)
9

REPLY TO ARGUMENT THREE
Defendant

sets

forth

self

serving

statements

that were

answered and noted by the Court, when it observed, that: "He's got
a credibility gap right now". "He's got a credibility gap, a
serious one". (T-306) "This is probably one of the most blatant
cases I have ever had before me in my seven years on the bench".
The Court in its capacity as fact finder simply didn't believe the
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY TO ARGUMENT FOUR
Awarding the Plaintiff Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars a month
permanent alimony and the Defendant calling it a "reward" under the
facts of this case does beg the need for the Defendant to return to
college for another Five (5) years of education, and perhaps
thereafter the Defendant may understand that if it costs him Six
Hundred ($600.00) to Seven Hundred ($700.00) Dollars a month to
maintain and feed himself that the Plaintiff and the parties' three
minor children need more than the Plaintiff has been awarded herein
to feed and maintain themselves. The debts and obligations claimed
by the Defendant, including the convenient debts owed to his
father, can all be discharged in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant/Appellant, who participated and co-authored the
Findings of Fact, can not now claim error to obtain a reversal.
The Plaintiff/Appellee submits that there is adequate basis in
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fact and law to support the award of permanent alimony in the
instant case.
There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff/Appellee's is
in need of support and maintenance, and that she does not have the
ability to provide, if ever, said support for herself, and further
that the Defendant/Appellant does have the income or the capability
of generating income sufficient to meet his needs and the needs of
the Plaintiff/Appellee.
It is cohabitation, and not sexual relations, that is the
triggering

contingency that terminates alimony. A finding of

cohabitation is not supported by the evidence in the record.
The Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
affirm

the

lower

Court

determination,

and

hold

that

Defendant/Appellant be ordered to pay permanent alimony to the
Plaintiff/Appellee, in the sum of $200.00 per month.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

P*^

day of May, 1993.

/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

day of May, 1993, two

true and correct copies of the BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE, was duly
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served by personally delivering the same to:
JOHN WALSH
Attorney at Law
2319 South Foothill Drive, Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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